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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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1 OF 1

10 MARCH 1971

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# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

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
10 MARCH 1971  
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## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 1 - 7 MARCH 1971

Moscow (3713 items)

CPSU 24th Congress	(19%)	18%
Indochina	(11%)	10%
International Women's Day	(--)	7%
Middle East	(3%)	6%
[Soviet Government Statement, 27 Feb.	(2%)	2%]
Mongolian Revolution, 50th Anniversary	(0.3%)	5%
China	(5%)	4%

Peking (2662 items)

Indochina	(47%)	37%
[Battle Reports	(15%)	15%]
[Sihanouk Tour of PRC	(14%)	7%]
Domestic Issues	(35%)	33%
President Nixon's State of World Report	(--)	7%
PRC-Japanese Trade Talks	(2%)	4%
U.S. "Provocations" in Korea	(--)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

Propaganda surrounding the surprise weekend visit to Hanoi of the PRC party-government delegation led by Chou En-lai dramatizes Sino-Vietnamese solidarity and reaffirms communist determination not to let the struggle in Indochina be deterred by U.S.

"escalation" in Laos and Cambodia or by threats of action against the DRV. The joint communique, released on 10 March, said the two sides "have held discussions on questions as to how to deal with possible military adventures by U.S. imperialism and have reached completely identical views."

The communique also stated that the Chinese are determined to give all-out support, "not flinching from the greatest national sacrifices"--a phrase used by Chou in a speech on the 6th and pointedly noted by Pham Van Dong on the 7th. In this regard Pham Dong warned "the U.S. imperialists" to "remember the well-deserved lessons of their miscalculations all along the years." He went on to declare that the Indochinese have the backing of "700 million Chinese people" and "the militant solidarity of the entire socialist camp," a statement in line with Hanoi's practice over the years of stressing the importance of communist unity.

North Vietnamese resolve to persist in the war is also highlighted in publicity for the seventh session of the Third National Assembly, held from 2 to 4 March. The political report, delivered by Pham Van Dong, and other propaganda condemn U.S. "escalation and threats" and call for vigilance along the lines of the 10 December joint party-government appeal.

Vietnamese and Laotian communist propaganda on the Laos operation denies that South Vietnamese forces captured the crossroads town of Tchepone on 6 March and continues to claim a series of victories against allied forces. Persistent rebuttals of U.S. statements that the Laos operation shows the success of Vietnamization are sharpened in a 4 March QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article by military commentator "Chien Binh" (Combatant): The "successive annihilation of a series of the most seasoned puppet battalions," he says, is "a thorough negation of the illusion about the Saigon army's independent strength which Nixon has tried to create for the past few years."

### CHOU EN-LAI LEADS PRC DELEGATION ON SURPRISE VISIT TO DRV

The visit from 5 to 8 March of the PRC party-government delegation led by Chou En-lai has highlighted Peking's pledge of rear area "support and assistance" to its Indochinese allies. For the first

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time in recent years the Chinese have associated their security interests with the DRV and Indochina as a whole, thus broadening Peking's authoritative statements last month terming the incursion into Laos a grave menace to China. The North Vietnamese, who took the occasion to stress their concern over a threat to their security posed by current military operations near their borders, effusively hailed the visit as a great encouragement in their struggle and as "a stern warning" to the United States.

Chou's visit, announced only after his departure from Hanoi on the 8th, was his first foreign trip since visiting the DPRK last April. He had briefly visited Hanoi in September 1969 after Ho Chi Minh's death. Chou's delegation included two other Politburo members, Yeh Chien-ying, vice chairman of the party's military commission, and Chiu Hui-tso, a deputy chief of staff in charge of the PLA's rear services; Keng Piao, former ambassador to Albania and now formally identified as director of the CCP's international liaison department; the deputy foreign minister in charge of Far Eastern affairs; the director of the armament department of the PLA general logistics department; and various other officials. The presence of the logistics officers points up one purpose of the visit, though there was no announcement of a new aid agreement. An agreement on supplementary economic and military aid from the PRC for this year had been signed on 15 February.

Talks were held between the PRC delegation and Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong (who acted as principal host for his Chinese counterpart), Defense Minister Giap, Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, and others. President Ton Duc Thang and Le Duc Tho, the only top leaders not present at the talks, attended some of the ceremonies. Speeches were exchanged on each of the four days of the visit, including a welcoming ceremony and a banquet on the 5th, a major rally on the 6th, a banquet on the 7th, and a farewell ceremony on the 8th.

#### COMMUNIQUE SAYS DRV, PRC AGREE ON RESPONSE TO U.S. "ADVENTURES"

A lengthy joint communique released on 10 March says the two sides, having studied the "grave situation" resulting from the expanding war in Indochina, "have taken full account of the recklessness and madness of the Nixon Government" and have reached "completely identical views" regarding "how to deal with possible military adventures" by the United States. The communique goes

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on to record the DRV's determination to join with the Laotian and Cambodian peoples to drive the United States out of Indochina and declares that "no brute force or truculent threat can shake the strong will of the three peoples of Indochina to fight to the finish."

As for the Chinese side, the communique says the Chinese people are determined "to take all necessary measures, not flinching even from the greatest national sacrifices," to render "all-out support and assistance" to the Vietnamese and other Indochinese peoples in case the United States should "go down the road of expanding its war of aggression in Indochina."

The communique registers both sides' support for the South Vietnamese Front's proposals for a Vietnam settlement, as well as for the proposals on a Laos settlement advanced by the Laotian Patriotic Front and Sihanouk's five-point declaration. Peking had failed to even mention the existence of the May 1969 NFLSV/PRG proposals until October of that year; its first endorsement of them appeared in the 13 December 1970 party-government statement supporting the DRV's appeal issued three days earlier.

LINKAGE OF PRC,  
DRV SECURITY

The communique is notable for directly linking China's security with that of the DRV, a linkage which the Chinese have carefully avoided in recent years. In a passage reviewing current military developments, the communique says this "new and extremely grave war escalation" by the United States against South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia "directly menaces the security of the DRV and at the same time the security of the PRC, thus creating a dangerous situation to peace in Asia and the world."

During the visit the North Vietnamese repeatedly cited military operations near their borders as posing a threat to the DRV, though without also linking these developments with China's security. That Hanoi wished for the Chinese to associate themselves with the DRV's security interests was suggested by DRV Paris delegation head Xuan Thuy's charge at the 18 February session that China as well as the DRV is threatened by the operation in Laos, the U.S. buildup near the DMZ, air strikes against the DRV, and increased naval activities in the Tonkin Gulf--the very evidence cited in the communique as showing a threat to both the DRV and China. Unlike DRV media, Peking did not report Thuy's remarks. Moreover, during the visit Chou was less explicit than his hosts in citing evidence of a threat to

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the DRV, having recourse to the vague formulation that the United States is planning "new military adventures" against North Vietnam.

Chou introduced the question of China's security in his speech at the 5 March banquet. After pointing out that the three Indochinese countries are close neighbors of China, he charged that expansion of the Indochina conflict by the United States poses "a grave threat to China." Chou's reference to China's security marked the first time this issue had been raised by Peking in a context broader than a specifically Laotian one. Peking had first broached this issue in the 12 February government statement terming the incursion into Laos "a grave menace to China," but it was ignored for nearly two weeks following the 20 February PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article sharply challenging President Nixon's dismissal of the question of Chinese security.\*

#### CHINESE SUPPORT

The Chinese promise in the communique to take all necessary measures, "not flinching even from the greatest national sacrifices," was first offered by Chou in a major speech at the rally on the 6th. In that speech, however, Chou did not link China's security with that of the DRV, a missing element that would seem to mute some of the ominous overtones in the reference to national sacrifices. At the same time, Chou's discussion of Chinese aid followed standard lines of rear area support; he invoked Mao's statement that China is the "reliable rear area" of the Vietnamese as "the firm and unshakable principle . . . as well as a guide to action" of the PRC. In the communique, on the other hand, this quotation of Mao is passed over in favor of his 20 May 1970 statement following the incursion into Cambodia, and there is no explicit reference to China as a rear area. The communique simply quotes the Chinese as saying it is their "unshirkable internationalist duty to give support and assistance" to the Vietnamese.

Pham Van Dong, speaking at a banquet the day after Chou introduced the formulation about national sacrifices, seized upon Chou's statement to deliver a warning to the United States to "remember the well-deserved lessons of [its] miscalculations all along these years"--a possible allusion to the Korean War. Noting that the

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\* The charge that the Laos operation menaces China's security was revived on 7 March in a Peking report alleging U.S. provocations against Chinese fishing boats in the Tonkin Gulf on 10 and 20 February.

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United States is expanding the Indochina conflict and has "threatened to invade" the DRV, Dong warned that the Indochinese peoples have "the powerful backing" of the Chinese, "the militant solidarity of the entire socialist camp," and the support of anti-imperialist and peace forces throughout the world. He also called Chou's visit and "firm statements"--which "will reverberate far and wide" in Vietnam and on all the Indochina battlefields--"a stern warning" to the United States.

Speaking at the same banquet, on the 7th, Chou expressed a quite different mood. He mentioned that in their talks the Chinese and the North Vietnamese had reached completely identical views on "further strengthening the friendly cooperation and mutual support and assistance" between the two countries. Taking note of North Vietnamese efforts to heighten their vigilance and to prepare "to face new battles and seize new victories," Chou exuded confidence over the tide of battle and explained that the enemy will be driven into a still more passive position from having spread out its forces to cope with the three peoples of Indochina.

Chou's farewell remarks on the 8th likewise were in keeping with the long-standing Chinese posture of rear area support for the Vietnamese. He called the joint communique an important document and assured his hosts that the Chinese people "in the great rear area" will redouble their efforts to do even better in giving support to the Vietnamese and to fulfill the tasks laid down in the communique. Similarly, NCNA's report on the delegation's return to Peking said the purpose of the visit was to convey "the most cordial regards and the highest respects" to the Vietnamese people "fighting at the frontline" and to express the Chinese people's "iron will" to aid the Vietnamese and the other peoples of Indochina "in thoroughly defeating" the United States.

Thus, Peking does not seem to have indicated a change in its assessment of the Indochina situation or of its own position as a rear base, and it left to the North Vietnamese the role of drawing out the implications of Chou's visit as providing a warning to the United States. The divergent approaches reflected in the two sides' respective statements, viewed against the background of Peking's marked reticence toward associating Chinese security interests with the DRV's, suggest that Chou's visit, particularly as reflected in the communique, represented a move by the Chinese to meet North Vietnamese needs for reassurance part way. Peking seems to have acceded to Hanoi's wishes by linking the two countries' security, and it went so far as to hint at stronger

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measures against the enemy by expressing a willingness to accept "the greatest national sacrifices." Nonetheless, it expressed this willingness as being conditioned on a further expansion of the Indochina conflict to a degree left unspecified.

### DRV ASSEMBLY CALLS FOR "EVERY SACRIFICE" UNTIL "TOTAL VICTORY"

The seventh session of the Third National Assembly, held from 2 to 4 March, provided a platform for further authoritative Hanoi condemnation of U.S. "escalation" and for appeals for continued vigilance. Hanoi media on the 5th announced that the session had been held and that same day carried the text of the political report, delivered at the session by Pham Van Dong, and an Assembly statement--described as being issued in connection "with the current grave situation in Vietnam and Indochina created by the U.S. acts of war intensification and expansion." NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorials on the 7th hail the Assembly's "important statement."

Dong in the political report makes the routine charge that the U.S. Vietnamization policy is aimed at "turning South Vietnam into a U.S. neocolony and military base, perpetuating the partition of Vietnam and threatening the DRV." And he says that the current "big operation near the DMZ and in southern Laos has highly adventurous objectives." He goes on to echo other propaganda in detailing alleged allied losses.

The Premier says that President Nixon in his foreign policy report on the 25th had "disclosed in the clearest terms and the most concentrated manner his perfidious schemes and methods against the three Indochinese countries." He takes issue particularly with the President's assessment of Vietnamization and his assertion that he wants "serious negotiations."

Dong says that "our enemy" has not given up his designs against the North since it is the "great rear base of a great front" and has "always been the firm base of the revolution." And he goes on to appeal for "rock-like determination" on both the military and economic fronts. After stressing Vietnamese determination to fight and win, he also expresses gratitude for the support and assistance from the socialist countries--saying that at present it has "become firmer and stronger" as an answer to U.S. escalation. He concludes by recalling the exhortation in Ho Chi Minh's testament that the war may drag on, and new sacrifices of property and human lives made, but regardless "we must be resolved to fight . . . till total victory."

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The statement issued by the Assembly "vehemently denounces and severely condemns" the Nixon Administration for intensifying and expanding the war to all of Indochina and placed full responsibility on the United States for its acts. It demands that the United States "stop immediately its war of aggression" in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, "stop for good all acts of war" against the DRV, and totally and unconditionally withdraw all allied troops from Indochina. It asserts that the Vietnam issue must be settled on the basis of the PRG's 10 point solution and eight point elaboration.

The statement calls on all of the people and armed forces to "respond actively" to the 10 December party-government appeal and "strictly implement" the resolution passed at the VWP Central Committee's 19th plenum in January. Like Dong, it expresses "sincere thanks" for the support and assistance of the fraternal socialist and friendly countries. It calls on them and the peoples of the world, including Americans, "to take timely measures to prevent the U.S. military adventures" in Indochina and to demand an end to the war. The editorials in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 7th both describe the Assembly statement as a "severe warning" to the United States. And NHAN DAN says it was issued in the face of President Nixon's foreign policy report and the 4 March press conference in which he "most clearly and fully revealed his cunning plots and maneuvers to intensify and expand the war in Indochina and to take a new war escalation step against North Vietnam."

NHAN DAN adds that in response to "this important statement," the people and armed forces of the DRV "under party leadership" are determined to fulfill their role as "a steady prop for our people's" struggle and "to fulfill their international obligations" toward Laos and Cambodia. Asserting that "despite pitiful setbacks" the "U.S. aggressors and their henchmen are still unwilling to give up their scheme of intimidating, harassing, and invading" North Vietnam, it says "we must be more vigilant, stand ready to fight, and rapidly strengthen our forces in every respect."

Underscoring the DRV's return to a more vigilant stance domestically, it says "we are determined to fulfill our combat duty in any part of our country, are ready to overcome all hardships and sacrifices . . . , satisfactorily carry out the military service, join the armed forces, participate in the communications and transportation activities, serve the fighting, always stand ready to fight, and frustrate all schemes and acts of the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys that are aimed at violating the airspace, territorial waters, and territory of the northern part of our country."

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**COMMUNISTS CLAIM MORE VICTORIES IN LAOS, DENY LOSS OF TCHEPONE**

Communist statistics on alleged allied losses in Operation Lam Son 719 now place total allied casualties in Laos at over 6,000 troops.\* The claim is made in a 7 March NLHS Central Committee statement, released by the Pathet Lao news agency on the 8th and carried by VNA on the 9th. An earlier communique from the Laotian "liberation armed forces" command, tallying the results of action from 1 February to 3 March, had claimed that more than 5,500 allied troops had been put out of action along Laotian Highway 9. The army communique, broadcast by the Pathet Lao radio on the 7th, also said that more than 250 aircraft had been shot down and more than 200 vehicles destroyed--half of them tanks and armored cars. (The communique, which also reported on alleged achievements in other parts of Laos, has not been monitored from Vietnamese communist media, although earlier Laotian "liberation armed forces" communiqués on the fighting in southern Laos were publicized by both Pathet Lao and Vietnamese communist media on 14 and 24 February.)

Alleged allied losses along Highway 9 in Quang Tri are currently totaled in a 4 March message of congratulations from the South Vietnamese PLAF command to the "Khe Sanh fighters." The message, reported by LPA on the 7th, claims that since the start of the incursion into Laos in early February the PLAF "on the Khe Sanh front" have wiped out over 2,000 allied troops, including more than 1,000 Americans.\*\* In addition, the message says they "seized a large quantity of weapons," shot down or destroyed nearly 70 aircraft, wrecked more than 200 military vehicles, two-thirds of which were tanks and armored cars, and "burnt out 14 logistics depots." A 6 March LPA battle report claims that since the beginning of the incursion into Laos nine U.S. military convoys comprising 101 military vehicles have been destroyed on Highway 9 by the Khe Sanh troops.

**TCHEPONE FIGHTING**      Laotian and Vietnamese communist propaganda uniformly contradicts South Vietnamese reports that the crossroads city of Tchepone was captured by South Vietnamese forces on 6 March. An official denial is made

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\* A VNA commentary on 2 March had claimed that in February alone the insurgents in Laos had put nearly 4,000 allied troops out of action.

\*\* The 2 March VNA report claimed a total of 1,700 allied casualties, including "nearly 1,000" Americans, on the Khe Sanh front.

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in an 8 March statement by a spokesman of the Laotian "liberation army" command which states flatly: "Tchepone township is still under full control of the Lao army and people. Not a single American aggressor or Saigon puppet has been able to set foot in Tchepone." The statement maintains that the announcement of the "imaginary victory" was made in an effort to "cover up" allied "setbacks." The allied forces in Laos, according to the statement, are in fact "seriously bogged down," have lost "an important part of their strength and war means," and are "facing an extremely dangerous situation."

Also on the 8th and again on the 10th, the Hanoi press ridicules the announced entry of South Vietnamese forces into Tchepone. The announcement is denied in commentaries on the fighting in both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 8 March; the army paper also publishes a Commentator article deriding the South Vietnamese claim, as well as a dispatch from a correspondent who says he was in the town of Tchepone on 7 March and interviewed the chairman of the administrative committee of Tchepone district. According to the correspondent, the chairman noted that on the afternoon of 6 March "U.S. aircraft came and dropped bombs, striking down several trees, hampering our traffic for awhile," but that "now everything has returned to normal" and "our trucks continue to roll unimpeded."

The 8 March QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Commentator article ridicules the announcement about Tchepone by recalling a succession of Western news reports which had previously quoted South Vietnamese officials as reporting the occupation of Tchepone. The other commentary in the army paper on the same day claims that the Laotian insurgents have dealt "stunning blows" to the allied "'leapfrogging' tactics" used to move South Vietnamese troops by helicopter toward the Tchepone area. To document its claim, the paper cites action against South Vietnamese forces landing on Ta Pang mountain--three kilometers south of Tchepone--in which 16 helicopters were allegedly downed, as well as a 6-7 March attack on Hill 723, 10 kilometers southwest of Ban Dong, in which 300 allied troops were allegedly killed or wounded and "many" others captured. It also recalls antiaircraft attacks on the 3d when the insurgents allegedly downed 15 aircraft involved in the landing of troops in the area of Hill 723. In addition to denying that allied troops entered Tchepone, the commentary claims that the leapfrogging movement of troops to hills "south of Highway 9 near Tchepone" required the allies both to introduce "tens of thousands more reinforcements" and to "call off the prong" of allied forces north of Highway 9.

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An article in the 7 March QUAN DOI NHAN DAN had reacted to earlier South Vietnamese claims to be approaching Tchepone, charging that "the so-called offensive stage of the U.S.-puppets current invasion of southern Laos is but a label to cover their critical situation." The paper also said the allies had "abandoned a prong of their operation and massed troops on several hills to make their deployment seem longer and to readjust the objectives of their operation." In this connection, the article noted Secretary Laird's remark that Tchepone was not an objective of the allied forces.

# REFERENCE TO COMMUNIST ARMORED FORCES IN LAOS

The first known acknowledgment in Hanoi comment of the communist use of tanks in Laos comes in a 5 March QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary hailing attacks north of Ban Dong from 26 February to 3 March in which the insurgents allegedly "annihilated" the 17th Armored Group, the 8th Airborne Battalion, and an element of the 11th Armored Group. A VNA report on the 5th specifies that the 26 February battle involved the 8th battalion of the 2d Airborne Brigade, under cover of tanks and armored cars of the 17th Armored Group.\* The paper claims that 84 tanks and armored cars were destroyed or seized and "many" troops captured in these engagements. Crediting various branches of the "southern Laos liberation combatants" with playing a part in these "battles of annihilation," QUAN DOI NHAN DAN notes that "the heroic armored troops outstandingly intercepted and annihilated many puppet tanks and airborne troops."

Accompanying reports on the fighting note that the allied units involved were attempting to regain control of Hill 456 (designated by the allies as Hill 31). And QUAN DOI NHAN DAN comments that the "victories" exposed the allies' "fraudulent claims" that they had reoccupied Hill 31 and destroyed enemy tanks. "The truth is," according to the army paper, "that they could not even approach Hill 456 or destroy any tanks."

# "CHIEN BINH" COMMENT

QUAN DOI NHAN DAN's authoritative military commentator "Chien Binh" (Combatant) comments on the Laos incursion in the 4 March issue of the army

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\* Initial communist comment on this engagement claimed, as does comment on the 5th, that 17 allied tanks and armored cars were destroyed and 13 captured but made no mention of the use of communist armored forces and did not name the allied units involved. (See 3 March TRENDS, page 9.)

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paper.\* Chien Binh maintains that the Laos operation is "of great importance for the Americans" and comments that "therefore their failure on this battlefield is of very great significance." Portraying the allied forces as confused and helpless, he makes the unusual observation that there was "no violent or vehement opposition" to the allies during the first three days of the operation and later quotes AFP for the remark that it was only after their forces had become endangered by communist attacks that "they realized they had been lured in when the communists allowed them to enter their zone so easily."

Chien Binh ridicules the Administration's hope that the Laos operation would bolster the program of Vietnamization. He comments at one point that "the fact that a series of the most seasoned puppet battalions were successively annihilated is an additional deadly blow dealt to the puppet troops' combat spirit and is a thorough negation of the illusion about the Saigon army's independent strength which Nixon has tried to create for the past few years." The future of the South Vietnamese army is also discussed in a later passage in which Chien Binh describes the President as "dazzled by imaginary successes and infatuated with fallacious optimism," as "stupidly ignoring advice," and as "engaging in frenzied adventures." In this context, Chien Binh observes that "Nixon himself has exposed the weakness of the puppet troops while trying to prove the strength of the mercenary army. He has dug a grave to bury the puppet army . . . ."

**POLICY ON POW'S** Communist policy toward prisoners is spelled out in an 8 March NLHS Central Committee statement, publicized by Laotian and Vietnamese communist media on the 9th and 10th, which promises humane treatment for prisoners and a warm welcome to all allied combatants who mutiny or come over to "the revolutionary side." It pledges to help them "return home" and to help "antiwar GI's" to "seek political asylum in another country of their choice, if they so request."

Exploiting prisoners allegedly taken in the fighting along Highway 9, Hanoi media on the 8th and the Pathet Lao news agency on the 9th carried remarks attributed to Col. Nguyen Van Tho, the commander of Saigon's 3d Airborne Brigade, said to have been

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\* Chien Binh discussed the allied use of helicopters in Laos in a 26 February QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article.

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captured on 25 February on Hill 31.\* The purported statement by Tho indicates that all the officers and staff of the brigade surrendered and have been given lenient treatment by the "liberation troops." It asserts that Lam Son 719 has "in effect been defeated" and urges other ARVN troops to "take prompt action in order to avoid a tragic fate, avoid a senseless and useless death." Hanoi propaganda has noted and ridiculed Western press reports that Colonel Tho was not captured and escaped to safety.

### COMMUNIQUE CITES ALLEGED ALLIED LOSSES IN CAMBODIAN OPERATION

Communist media publicize a 1 March communique reviewing alleged communist achievements against the major South Vietnamese sweep into the Cambodian provinces of Kompong Cham and Kratie begun on 4 February--Operation Total Victory. The communique, issued by the Sihanouk government (RGNU) defense ministry and supreme military command, was transmitted by both AKI and VNA on 5 March, and the "victories" are lauded in a NHAN DAN article on the 6th.

The communique claims that from 4 to 28 February the insurgents in Kompong Cham and Kratie provinces launched about 200 attacks and killed, wounded, or captured 5,500 Saigon troops,\*\* "annihilating" three Ranger battalions and one regular battalion and "seriously mauling" several others. In addition, according to the communique, 500 military vehicles including 300 tanks and armored cars were burned or destroyed, 32 aircraft were shot down, 50 guns destroyed, scores of munitions and gasoline depots set ablaze, 13 warships sunk, and hundreds of arms and a large amount of other military equipment seized.

The NHAN DAN article of the 6th comments that the Cambodians' "victorious attacks are coordinated very well with the Lao and Vietnamese people's fight against Nixon's new military adventures." In addition to recounting the alleged achievements against the

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\* On 1 March Liberation Radio similarly broadcast remarks by two prisoners allegedly captured on 19 February during an attack on Hill 500.

\*\* A 25 February LPA editorial had claimed that 2,000 troops were wiped out by the insurgents in 10 days of fighting against the allied operation.

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South Vietnamese operation, NHAN DAN points to other successes, including the 2 March attack on the oil refinery at Kompong Som; it claims that 75 percent of the refinery complex was destroyed. The paper also says the insurgents "have firmly maintained control over Highway 4" and have "wiped out many enemy military transport convoys."

Like other communist comment, NHAN DAN credits South Vietnamese insurgents in Tay Ninh Province with the helicopter crash on 23 February which killed the commander of the South Vietnamese operation in Cambodia, Gen. Do Cao Tri. The paper comments that the action was a "good coordinated offensive blow."

#### HANOI, FRONT SCORE U.S. "ACTS OF WAR," "THREATS" AGAINST DRV

Following the 3 March DRV Foreign Ministry statement\*, Vietnamese communist propaganda continues to stress "increasingly serious acts of war" and alleged U.S. plans for "new military adventures" against the DRV. Both the DRV and PRG chief delegates to the Paris talks issued statements denouncing intensification of the war in Indochina and of U.S. actions against the DRV. Xuan Thuy's 3 March statement echoed portions of the foreign ministry statement in its charges about the massing of U.S. and ARVN forces near the 17th parallel, the dispatch of ships of the 7th Fleet into the Tonkin Gulf, and the intensification of "acts of war against the DRV." It also echoed the claim that these acts "violated" the U.S. pledge to "unconditionally" halt the bombing of the DRV and have "seriously threatened the work of the Paris conference." Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh's statement on the 4th similarly charged that the United States has committed more "acts of war" against the DRV and is "relentlessly preparing for a new military adventure against the DRV." Her statement reiterated the pledge of southern support for the "northern compatriots."

The VNA account of the Paris session on 4 March--the 105th--noted that Xuan Thuy and Mme. Binh "had refused to attend this session and issued statements as a sign of protest against the Nixon Administration's stepping up of war acts and plotting of new military adventures against the DRV." At the 104th session the PRG delegate had denounced the Administration for "scheming to take new military adventures" against the DRV, and VNA reported the DRV delegate as charging that the Administration had expanded the war to Cambodia, escalated the war in Laos, and "is preparing for incursions into North Vietnam."

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\* See the TRENDS of 3 March, pages 4-6, for an account of the statement and surrounding comment.

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Hanoi and Liberation radio broadcasts and an LPA commentary, all on 4 March, denounced President Thieu's remarks the previous day on a possible South Vietnam invasion of the North. Hanoi and Liberation Radio suggested that such "threats" are evidence that President Nixon is planning "new military adventures against the DRV" made necessary by "heavy setbacks" in other arenas of the war. Liberation Radio added that "everyone knows Thieu is only a loudspeaker for Nixon. He has merely repeated the slanderous arguments of the United States, denouncing the North for invading the South while announcing their attempt to engage in new military adventures against the DRV." All three commentaries pointed to the 3 March DRV Foreign Ministry statement as demonstrating the North's resolve to continue fighting. Liberation Radio and LPA routinely pledged the southerners' support of that struggle.

Official PRG comment came from PRG Vice President Phung Van Cung in remarks to a PLAF unit at an award ceremony in eastern Nam Bo, reported by LPA on 6 March. LPA says he "severely condemned the Nixon Administration's intensification of its war acts and new military adventures against the DRV." His specific charges echoed those in other propaganda.

DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN'S PROTEST      A DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's protest on 9 March charged the United States with "recent attacks" against Vinh Linh area and Quang Binh. In routine terms, the spokesman "sternly denounced and severely condemned these acts of war" and demanded an end to all U.S. "encroachments on DRV sovereignty and security."

The spokesman's statement charges that U.S. aircraft, including B-52's, "dropped demolition and steel-pellet bombs and fired rockets on many places in Huong Lap village" from 3 to 7 March. At the same time, it says, U.S. artillery shelled Vinh Son and Vinh Giang villages from positions south of the demilitarized zone. Echoing other recent protests, it emphasizes that these villages are located in the DMZ "belonging to DRV territory."

The protest also says U.S. aircraft "struck a number of places" in Quang Binh Province on 6 March, claiming that one of the planes was downed and that "several U.S. air pirates lost their lives." The spokesman's statement does not update Hanoi's tally of U.S. planes downed over the DRV. It had been placed at 3,376 as of 4 March, when Hanoi claimed that a U.S. plane

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had been downed in Quang Binh that day and used the same formula as the one in the foreign ministry spokesman's protest--"several U.S. air pirates lost their lives."

The reports of the 4 March downing also belatedly claimed that three "enemy" commando boats "which violated DRV territorial waters" were sunk or damaged on 19, 20, and 23 February by the armed forces of Nghe An and Quang Binh provinces and of Con Co island.

#### DRV, PRG ASSAIL PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE, POLICY REPORT

HANOI The DRV reacted promptly on the 5th to the President's televised press conference with a statement issued by its Paris delegation spokesman and a Hanoi radio commentary. The radio commentary was broadcast at 0430 GMT on the 5th--within two and a half hours after the President spoke. The broadcast says that the President's "confusion" as the result of "military defeats" and opposition to his policy led him to speak three times within 15 days on the Indochina question--in his 17 February press interview, his foreign policy report on the 25th, and the press conference on 4 March. A 6 March Commentator article in the army's QUAN DOI NHAN DAN says in a similar vein that the situation in Indochina has forced the President to "make too many statements." The paper notes that "on many occasions" he used "Kissinger, Laird, and the White House press secretary to ward off public opinion" but that ultimately he had to "intervene personally" to assuage public opinion.

The initial radio comment on the press conference said that the President continued to "make boastful statements on the war against the DRV" and that he represented Thieu's call for an attack on North Vietnam as motivated by self-defense. QUAN DOI NHAN DAN's Commentator represents the President as having "ordered" President Thieu to talk about invading the North and quotes him as saying the Americans "have not yet" devised a plan to support such attacks. The radio commentary also charges that the President continued to make "bandit allegations" about the unrestricted use of U.S. air power in Indochina and "stated that intervention elements--that is, U.S. infantry units--could be sent into North Vietnam in order to rescue U.S. pilots or prisoners." At the same time, the broadcast scored his "deceitful remark" that U.S. troops will stay in the South as long as American prisoners remain in the DRV.

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The statement by the DRV Paris spokesman, publicized on the 5th, had also called the President's press conference further evidence of the U.S. policy of "acts of war and preparations for new and extremely dangerous military adventures against the DRV." The statement said that the President revealed an intention to prolong the U.S. presence in South Vietnam "indefinitely," failing to acknowledge his statement on some U.S. troops remaining as long as U.S. prisoners are held in the North.

The radio commentary of the 5th and the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Commentator article take issue with the President's positive assessment of the Laos operation. The army papers ridicules claims that the South Vietnamese are fighting "better than their enemy," that the operation is progressing successfully, and that the communists' logistics supplies have been cut off. In rebuttal of the President, it cites, among other things, an AFP report that Secretary Laird recognized that the ARVN "has had to fight against a better army of a resolute and stalwart enemy."

The Commentator article dismisses the President's statement that the Laos operation has assured continuation of the U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam as "a clumsy trick--which he has used repeatedly--to soothe public opinion" and says the President must in fact continue to withdraw because of the 1972 presidential elections. Obscuring the details of the President's remarks, Commentator claims that he "prepared public opinion for sending U.S. infantry forces into southern Laos" and "clamored" to bomb the North and resort to "other war acts, such as the use of commandos to sabotage" the DRV. In this regard, the article says the President claimed that "his clique's offensives are aimed at rescuing American POW's."

THE FRONT Front propaganda is highlighted by a PRG Foreign Ministry statement,\* carried by LPA on the 6th, reacting to both the President's press conference and the foreign policy report. In both cases, the statement says, the President "noisily boasted about the imaginary successes" of Vietnamization and the "U.S. aggressive wars" in Cambodia and

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\* The DRV Foreign Ministry responded to the President's Foreign Policy report to Congress with a statement on 2 March. See the TRENDS of 3 March, pages 1-3.

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Laos while continuing to spread his "peace hoaxes" to appease public opinion. It further says he "revealed his dark intention to prolong and extend" the war in an attempt to save his Vietnamization program. The statement makes no further specific references to the foreign policy report or the press conference, going on to claim routinely that Vietnamization "is going bankrupt and is sure to meet with complete failure," that ARVN forces are losing despite U.S. equipment and training, and that the Saigon administration is "increasingly opposed by the people who are resolved to overthrow it."

Also routinely, the statement says the Administration launched a war in Cambodia and sent ARVN forces to Laos to try and "stave off failure in South Vietnam." It goes on to charge that the Americans have multiplied their "acts of war" against the DRV and "continued to arrogate to themselves the right to unrestricted use of U.S. airpower to attack North Vietnam while contemplating new military adventures" against it. It says that on U.S. orders, "the Thieu-Ky-Khiem puppet administration is raving for a 'March to the North.'"

As evidence that the Administration has done its best to block a search for a political solution, the statement says it has ignored the "logical and reasonable" NFLSV/PRG proposals, with their call for "an immediate and unconditional U.S. troop withdrawal and renunciation of the Saigon administration." The South Vietnamese people and the PRG, the statement declares, "categorically denounce the peace fallacies" voiced by the President, "vehemently condemn" the U.S. Administration for prolonging and expanding the war, and "sternly warn it against any attempt to take new military adventures against the DRV." It expresses resolve to "punish" the United States for acts against the North and reaffirms the unity of the three Indochinese peoples.

Liberation Radio on the 5th and an LPA commentary on the 6th reiterate the notion that the press conference was held to "justify the President's policy of aggression" and to "loudly make warlike boasts." Like Hanoi, both note that this was the President's third discussion of Indochina in 15 days.

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Again like Hanoi, Liberation Radio says the President tried to defend "his spreading of the war . . . to Cambodia and Laos, saying that his act was 'correct' and was a guarantee of the plan for the withdrawal of U.S. troops." Claiming that the President "invented the imaginary victories" of the allies in order to "advertise the Vietnamization plan and the Nixon Doctrine," the radio remarks that "the whole world is aware of the heavy setbacks" of the allies.

The Liberation Radio commentary is unique in saying that the President not only demanded "that the two sides withdraw troops but also requested that the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam be related to the reciprocal withdrawal of troops from Laos and Cambodia."

Regarding North Vietnam, LPA says the President "threatened to continue to use U.S. air power to strike the DRV and insolently said that the United States would send 'rescue units' into North Vietnam to save downed pilots and U.S. POW's." Liberation Radio adds that he reiterated "threats" to use the U.S. Air Force to attack missile positions in North Vietnam and that "with his roundabout allegations, he appeared to approve" President's Thieu's call to attack the North. LPA claims further that he "openly encouraged his Saigon agents to go ahead with their 'March to the North' by saying that it is a necessity." LPA and Liberation Radio both score the President for "impudently stating" that some U.S. troops will remain in South Vietnam as long as there are prisoners in the DRV. "It is clear," LPA says, "that Nixon has misused the question of POW's to continue the war."

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## DRV, PRG DELEGATES AT PARIS FOCUS ON PRESIDENT'S REPORT

VNA's account of the 105th Paris session on 4 March recounts both communist delegates' attacks on President Nixon's 25 February foreign policy report. Substituting for Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh (who boycotted the session along with chief DRV delegate Xuan Thuy in protest, VNA said, of the Administration's "stepping up of war acts and plotting of new military adventures against the DRV"), the PRG's Nguyen Van Tien echoed last week's general propaganda charge that the President's report "revealed his policy to prolong and expand the war and maintain the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique." Nguyen Minh Vy, standing in for Xuan Thuy, called the report "one more proof" of the President's "bellicose and deceitful policy" and took issue with its "boasts" about success of the Nixon Doctrine and Vietnamization, saying that both are in fact "meeting with failure."

The VNA account reflects portions of both communist delegates' remarks on the question of negotiations. VNA cites Tien's routine statement that the correct way to end the war "has been clearly traced" in the PRG's 10-point solution and eight-point initiative. It also notes his avowal that the PRG and the Vietnamese people are "always ready to settle the South Vietnamese problem peacefully" but are also determined to fight if the United States pursues the war.

But VNA does not mention Tien's specific attacks on some of the statements on negotiations in the President's report, including the references to troop withdrawal, to the retention of some U.S. troops in South Vietnam as long as there are U.S. prisoners in the North (an added "condition" for troop withdrawal, according to Tien), and to the Vietnamese right to self-determination. Only LPA's account reports that the PRG delegate scored the President's remarks on the PRG proposal for a coalition government. It says Tien assailed the President's "allegation" that by advocating the formation of a broadly representative provisional coalition government made up of three components, the PRG delegation was trying to "secure political power."

Neither VNA nor LPA reports Tien's charge that the United States is becoming less and less interested in negotiations and that the President "affirmed that if the United States continues to participate in the Paris negotiations, it is

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only to find a solution to the problem of prisoners." Tien may be alone in Vietnamese communist propaganda in claiming that the President said the communists may find themselves negotiating with the South Vietnamese alone. (The President's report stated that the United States would not give up on negotiations but added that as U.S. forces decline, "the role we can play on many aspects of a settlement is also bound to decline.")

VNA says Tien adduced "concrete facts" to show that the Administration "has been trying to undermine the Paris talks," but it does not report Tien's listing of such examples as the use of U.S. infantry in Laos to protect "search and rescue" teams and failure to rule out the dispatch of U.S. and "puppet" troops to North Vietnam.

DRV delegate Vy, according to VNA, denounced the President for seeking to negotiate from a position of strength. Although VNA's account omits it, Vy charged in his text that the President "continued to harp on his distorting allegations, saying that the other side put forward preconditions. Yet he still clung to his 7 October five points, considering them 'the focal point of the U.S. peace proposal,'" and was trying to "force the other side to accept the U.S. arrogant preconditions"--an apparent allusion to the presidential report's brief recap of the five-point-proposal, followed by rejection of some elements of the communist negotiating position. Vy's statement took up the five-point proposal point by point, rejecting each one and scoring the President for "stubbornly opposing" the PRG's proposals. The President "threatened," Vy said, "that if the other side does not let us choose a negotiated settlement, then we shall follow another path."

The VNA account quotes Vy as stating: "we have repeatedly said that if the Nixon Administration is willing to negotiate seriously, we are prepared to do so too." To the U.S. authorities, Vy said, "serious negotiations" mean that a portion of U.S. forces will remain in Vietnam and other Indochinese countries and that U.S. "puppet" administrations will continue to exist. Declaring "we entirely reject this conception of serious negotiations," he said they require that the United States "fix a reasonable deadline" for withdrawal from Indochina, and "we shall discuss the conditions" for a

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rapid and total withdrawal; a further requirement is that the United States "renounce its agents" so that each Indochinese country may settle its own affairs. Vy routinely projected "heavier defeats" for the United States if the President "pursues the path of aggression and seeks a military victory," then cited the 2 March DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the President's report.

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## MOSCOW DWELLS ON PRESIDENT NIXON'S "THREATS" TO DRV

Moscow has reacted to President Nixon's 4 March press conference with selective reportage and limited routine-level comment which concentrates on what it calls the President's "threats" to the DRV but acknowledges little else of the substance of his remarks. The initial TASS and domestic service reports, on the 5th, asserted that the President said nothing new and that he merely tried to explain the incursions into Cambodia and Laos in terms of saving American lives in Vietnam and implementing Vietnamization. But he failed to placate American public opinion, Moscow said, and he "admitted" that the move into Laos had caused "disagreement and criticism" in the United States. Noting that he warned of "hard fighting" still ahead in Laos, TASS complained that he refused to give a timetable for troop withdrawal, saying rather that the United States "'will have to maintain a residual force in South Vietnam' indefinitely." TASS thus ignored the President's remark that the residual force would remain as long as Hanoi held U.S. prisoners. Another brief domestic service item on the 5th cited an AFP reporter as noting that the President ignored the PRG's proposal for a political settlement.

"THREATS" TO DRV      Reporting that President Nixon repeated his "threats" to the DRV, TASS and a domestic service report said he asserted that he would use "air power" against the North if he concluded there was a danger to the remaining U.S. forces in the South. Another domestic service report said he "attempted to prove the need" for an incursion of Saigon troops into the DRV and "made it quite clear that if such an adventure took place, it would be supported by the U.S. Air Force." TASS on the 6th, citing the observations of several commentators in the United States, noted that Roger Mudd of CBS had singled out "the President's refusal to rule out an invasion of the North" as "the most important" statement of the press conference.

Other Moscow comment also dwells on the alleged U.S. "threat" to the DRV. A 5 March domestic service commentary complains that the White House has not clearly defined its attitude toward Thieu's "threat" to send Saigon troops into the North. It notes that large U.S. and Saigon forces are concentrated near the 17th parallel, that "many" 7th Fleet ships have been moved into the Tonkin Gulf, and that the U.S. Air Force "daily" bombs and strafes the demilitarized zone and DRV territory.

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Regarding Thieu's statement, the commentary says "there is little doubt as to who calls the tune" and notes that Thieu made his statement after he had talked with Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams. A dispatch from Hanoi published in PRAVDA on the 5th, referring to Thieu's statement, similarly notes that the Saigon leaders are dependent on the United States and recalls the 3 March DRV Foreign Ministry statement which protested U.S. bombing raids and accused the United States of preparing "a new military adventure against the DRV." A 6 March RED STAR article by Col. V. Mochalov remarks on the presence of two divisions in the northern part of South Vietnam, observing that "the interventionists are leaving their forces in areas where they could be utilized for an attack on the DRV."

With respect to Soviet support for the Indochinese in response to the U.S. "threats," Moscow does not go beyond recalling the 25 February Soviet Government statement's promise of continued aid to the DRV and "Indochinese patriots." An English-language commentary by Shakov on the DRV National Assembly appeal, mentioning the President's press conference "threats" to use American air power against the DRV, notes that the DRV National Assembly expressed gratitude for support and aid from the socialist countries and recalls the Soviet Government statement's promises of aid.

Moscow has not been entirely consistent, however, in recalling the Soviet Government statement's pledge of continued aid. A 3 March IZVESTIYA article by Col. A. Pridybaylo, discussing the Laotian operation and the U.S. "threat" to resume bombing of the DRV, underscores the Indochinese people's determination to defend their freedom and notes that the Soviet Government statement "stressed" that the United States must halt aggression and recognize the rights of the people to determine their own future.

A 2 March RED STAR article by the jurist L. Savinskiy takes issue with arguments advanced in support of the Laos operation in the State Department's 8 February announcement. Savinskiy calls the operation a violation of the norms of relations between states and refers specifically to the declarations on principles of international law and on strengthening of international security approved at last year's UN General Assembly session. He concludes by recalling the warning in the Soviet Government statement that the actions of the United

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States, "which casts off its international commitments so lightly," will lead to undermining the foundations of interstate relations. But Savinskiy does not go on to quote the statement's reference to the impact on Soviet-U.S. relations or to mention its promises of Soviet aid to the Indochinese.

**CRITICISM OF PEKING** A Moscow commentary broadcast in Mandarin on 9 March, accusing the United States of trying to maintain the Sino-Soviet schism for its own advantage, cites among other things Kissinger's remark in his TV interview that "China would not send troops to help the Laotian patriotic forces because it has built up its troops on its other frontiers." While Moscow broadcasts in Mandarin have continued over the past few weeks to criticize the Chinese for refusing united action in Indochina, taunting them for passivity in the face of the threat to the PRC posed by the Laotian operation, Moscow is not known to have directly raised the issue of Chinese troop participation until now.

While aiming the main thrust of its criticism at the United States, the commentary includes some gibes at Peking for maintaining an "anti-Soviet stand" that gives the United States the "excuse" for its policy of fostering the Sino-Soviet rift. In other comment in Mandarin Moscow also continues to attack Peking's "splittist" policy regarding Indochina. A broadcast on the 7th criticized Chinese "splittist" policies in the face of Thieu's "threats" to invade the North and U.S. refusal to comment on Thieu's remarks.

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### BRITAIN SCORED FOR RELEASE OF SOUVANNA LETTER TO COCHAIRMAN

An NLHS Central Committee spokesman's statement dated 5 March, reported by the Pathet Lao news agency on the 8th, criticizes the British Government for unilaterally making public a letter from Souvanna Phouma to the two chairmen of the 1962 Geneva conference. The statement takes Britain to task for releasing on 4 March Souvanna Phouma's 5 February letter which "slandered" DRV troops for attacking various towns in Laos and demanded that they withdraw from Laos. The NLHS says that the British circulated the message "in spite of the flat-out disapproval by the Soviet Government." (Moscow is not known to have reported the NLHS statement or the British action.) The NLHS spokesman scored the British for aiding the United States in "sabotaging" the 1962 Geneva agreements and in widening the aggression in Indochina, and "flatly rejected" the letter from Souvanna Phouma, who "styles himself" as Prime Minister of the RLG.

The NLHS has in the past similarly issued central committee spokesman's statements denouncing such Souvanna Phouma letters, British replies and British moves to circulate Souvanna Phouma's letters, the most recent previous instance being a statement dated 16 July 1970. On at least one occasion--on 22 March 1969--Hanoi issued a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement denouncing a letter from the "Vientiane authorities," although normally Hanoi has responded only with NHAN DAN articles or has ignored the exchanges. Moscow normally is silent on the subject, only rarely acknowledging the exchanges obliquely and belatedly in routine-level comment.

### HANOI PROTESTS "PROVOCATIONS" AGAINST DRV EMBASSY IN LAOS

On 7 March VNA carries a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement protesting unspecified "provocative acts" perpetrated against the DRV embassy in Vientiane on the 5th. According to the spokesman, the "Vientiane authorities" permitted "reactionaries to compel a number of persons" to carry out these provocations. The statement says that by this act, "following the hectic campaign of slander against the DRV in recent days," the "Vientiane authorities" are following a line counter to the 1962 Geneva agreements and harmful to the traditional friendly relations between the Vietnamese and Lao people. The statement does not elaborate on the "recent" campaign of slander, but on

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1 March a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman had objected to a press conference held in Vientiane at which DRV prisoners were presented.

Hanoi has previously protested provocations against its embassy and personnel in Laos. A hand grenade attack on the embassy in January 1968 was protested by the DRV charge d'affaires to the Laotian Foreign Ministry and in a NHAN DAN article. Harassment of DRV embassy personnel was protested by a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman in March 1969, and an episode in August 1969, in which a number of DRV embassy personnel were arrested and expelled by the Vientiane government on espionage charges, elicited several high-level DRV statements.

#### FOREIGN MINISTER IN SIHANOUK GOVERNMENT VISITS NORTH KOREA

The third high-level Cambodian delegation to visit Pyongyang\* since the formation of Sihanouk's government (RGNU) arrived there at the invitation of the DPRK Government on 4 March, according to KCNA and NCNA reports. The delegation--led by Foreign Minister Sarin Chhak--returned to Peking on the 9th after having talks with Kim Il-song and DPRK Foreign Minister Ho Tam, and being feted at banquets and a Pyongyang city rally.

Speeches at the various events were routine in content, Ho Tam promising continued "material and moral" support and Sarin Chhak duly expressing gratitude. At a banquet given by the DPRK Cabinet on 4 March, Sarin Chhak praised the "support" received from both Korea and China; he routinely pledged that the Cambodian people would continue to fight "shoulder to shoulder" with the Vietnamese and Laotian people, and in this connection recalled the resolution of the April 1970 Indo-chinese people's summit conference. At a banquet he hosted on the 8th, Sarin Chhak described the DPRK and the PRC as the "mighty and reliable rear for the Indochina front." On various occasions both speakers cited Kim Il-song's formulation, originated during Sihanouk's visit in June, declaring that victory will be achieved "if the peoples of the various Asian countries making revolution--including Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, China, and Korea--form a common front and join in dealing collective blows at U.S. imperialism." Both speakers praised the consolidation of this "common front."

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\* Sihanouk visited Pyongyang in June 1970, and Ngo Hou, RGNU minister of public health, religious, and social affairs, led a delegation there in September 1970.

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## MIDDLE EAST

## MOSCOW GUARDED ON CHANCES FOR SUCCESS OF JARRING MISSION

Moscow propaganda follows the lines of the 27 February Soviet Government statement, praising Cairo's "realistic" approach and citing in particular its response to Jarring on readiness to conclude peace with Israel if the latter undertakes its obligations. U Thant's 5 March report to the Security Council on Jarring's mission, TASS says, approves the UAR's "peace-loving policy" and its positive reply to Jarring while criticizing Israel's "reluctance to respond" to Jarring's initiative.

Propagandists again denounce Israel's refusal to withdraw; echoing the government statement, they claim that the United States must share the blame for the impasse, and they draw a distinction between Washington's words and its deeds in providing Tel Aviv with political and military support. To buttress this argument, Moscow selectively cites President Nixon's press conference remarks, along with the U.S. position in the Big Four consultations. A Soviet Embassy statement takes the occasion of a New York TIMES report on Moscow's passivity in achieving a settlement to set the record straight, revealing--apparently for the first time publicly--the existence of Soviet proposals "presented last June."

Consistent with the recent paucity of Soviet comment on the cease-fire, Moscow notes as-Sadat's statement that the UAR will not be bound by any cease-fire agreement but follows this with only a passing reference to the increased danger of armed clashes. Predictably, as-Sadat's announcement of his unheralded 1-2 March talks in Moscow is ignored.

Moscow commentators reiterate the government statement's vague call for "active measures" by peace-loving countries, Matveyev expressing hope in the 4 March IZVESTIYA that pressure of public opinion, coupled with "appropriate diplomatic efforts by interested governments," will force "militaristic and reactionary circles" to take into account the "real facts."

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There is an occasional guardedly optimistic assessment, as in the 7 March domestic service commentators' roundtable,\* that prospects for success of the Jarring mission "undoubtedly exist" despite Israeli policy, but that to achieve success "a consistent course" for a political settlement is necessary "by all countries concerned." A domestic service commentary on the 4th contains the single hint of UN sanctions in commenting that the United Nations has the duty to "adopt authoritative measures" to force Israel to comply with UN decisions.

NIXON            There is little comment on the President's remarks on  
REMARKS        the Middle East in his 4 March press conference other  
                 than TV        March account noting that Mr. Nixon said  
the United States will do everything to urge the parties to talk  
and would see that balance of power is maintained. The  
President, TASS said        gave a negative answer when asked if the  
United States intend        exert influence on Israel to facilitate  
a peaceful settlement        Moscow takes no cognizance of the  
President's statement        that the United States is prepared to join  
the other major powers, including the USSR, in guaranteeing any  
settlement that is made, "which would give Israel the security  
of its borders that it might not get through any geographical  
acquisition." And Moscow has not been heard to report Mr. Nixon's  
7 March telephone interview with UPI in which he said that both  
major powers would exert a restraining effort.

Commentaries in Arabic on the 6th and the 8th singled out the  
statement "affirming U.S. lack of interest in putting pressure  
on Israel." The former asserted that the President introduced  
nothing new, only promising that the United States would try to  
convince the parties to negotiate, when the UAR, it added, has  
long expressed its acceptance of negotiations under Jarring.  
A Tsoppi foreign-language commentary on the 9th did not totally  
reject the notion of direct talks between the sides at some  
point, recalling that the President, in his State of the World

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\* The weekly domestic service roundtable feature of 7 March, in a second departure from practice in two consecutive weeks, was rebroadcast apparently for the first time in foreign languages, over a 2-day period. The program the preceding week, on 28 February, had varied from past practice when a new Middle East section was substituted in the last domestic service rebroadcast of the feature.

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Report, insisted on direct talks "even at the present stage" of the dispute. Tsoppi added that this proposal "could not be easily accepted" with Israel occupying Arab territory and wanting to put forward "unacceptable conditions."

Noting that in his press conference Mr. Nixon talked about maintaining the balance of power, Tsoppi remarked that Washington says it is opposed to the imposition of decisions on the disputing sides, but nevertheless supports Israel with arms and strengthens Tel Aviv's efforts to "impose surrender terms." Similarly, Mayevskiy charged, in a 10 March PRAVDA article reviewed by TASS, that Israel's "obstructionist policy" is a "direct result" of wide U.S. military and political aid. Facts show, he claimed, that Washington in its deeds does not support Jarring's mission and "other efforts" aimed at a political settlement, but would like an imposed settlement strengthening Israel's position.

Ryzhikov, in a TASS commentary on the 7th noting that President Nixon was scheduled to receive Israeli President Shazar that day, said one "would like to think" that Mr. Nixon "might recommend" that Israel stop obstructing a political settlement and get down to withdrawing its forces. But a foreign-language commentary by Soltan on the 8th claimed that prior to Israel's entry into the Jarring contacts "constant American-Israeli talks" were held and Israel received "certain assurances," and now Foreign Minister Eban was again going to Washington for talks "about the policy of blackmail."

BIG TWO, A Soviet Embassy statement reported by TASS on the  
BIG FOUR 3d defensively rejects a "distorted" New York TIMES  
report of a 1 March conversation between Ambassador  
Dobrynin and Secretary Rogers which "could hardly help" readers  
to gain a correct impression of the "actual positions" of the  
sides. Without correcting the readers' impression, the statement  
goes on to reject "the allegation that Moscow had broken off  
contacts with the United States" on the Middle East about eight  
months ago. Describing this as "in full contradiction" with  
the real state of affairs, the statement said Moscow is still  
waiting for a U.S. reply to "concrete constructive" Soviet  
proposals presented last June in the course of a bilateral  
exchange of views--proposals heretofore unacknowledged by  
Moscow. Infrequent propaganda allusions last July to Soviet  
proposals mentioned those "set forth in early 1969."

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In a departure from TASS' usually terse reporting of Big Four meetings, TASS correspondent Pivovarov on the 6th criticized the U.S. position in consultations during the week on a four-power communique "which would promote the success" of Jarring's mission.\* Pivovarov complained that the United States resisted the "most important provisions" of the draft communique--the need for Israeli withdrawal--and protested against reflecting the difference between the UAR's positive stand and Israel's negative approach on a peaceful settlement. "UN circles" point out, he added, that the United States instead insisted that the communique include a call for prolongation of the cease-fire agreement. The U.S. position, he concluded, contradicts Security Council Resolution 242.

**CEASE-FIRE**        There is minimal attention to the 7 March  
**EXPIRATION**       expiration of the cease-fire before or after  
                    UAR President as-Sadat's announcement in his  
7 March speech that Cairo could not again extend the cease-fire, and that it did not consider itself bound by the cease-fire nor bound to hold fire, but that "this does not mean that political action will stop and the guns alone will speak." TASS and an Arabic-language broadcast report him as saying that the UAR is not bound by any cease-fire agreement, but that it will "continue to work for a political settlement."

TASS had noted on the 6th, in reporting the Big Four negotiations over a possible four-power communique, that the United States insisted such a document should include a call for prolongation of the cease-fire agreement "on terms and in the form suitable for Israel." Solution of this question, TASS said, is "the prerogative of the sovereign Arab states whose territories are held by the aggressor."

The Tsoppi commentary on the 9th provides the only observation that the danger of armed clashes--"arising from Israel's aggressive policy and its claims on Arab countries"--has greatly increased now that the cease-fire agreement no longer exists. Prior to the expiration there were propaganda intimations that Cairo was not contemplating a resumption

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\* The only other recent departure from Moscow's usual reticence on the substance of the Big Four talks came in a 10 February PRAVDA article by Kolesnichenko. See the FBIS TRENDS, 10 February, pages 20-21.

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of fighting. A Yefremov domestic service commentary on the 6th noted foreign news agency speculation on what would happen if the cease-fire agreement expired, pointing out that UPI reported from Cairo that "the Egyptians will not open fire unless they are forced to do so by Israeli provocations." And a report from Viktor Kudryavtsev, Moscow radio's new correspondent in Cairo, on the domestic service on 4 March indirectly suggested that the UAR was more interested in getting on with domestic problems: He observed that the blackout had been lifted in Cairo, a number of restrictions caused by the state of war had been canceled, and while evidence of war is still present the people now have a chance to concern themselves with pressing economic problems.

AS-SADAT      Consistent with Moscow's treatment of Nasir's public  
IN USSR      acknowledgment last July of his secret visit to  
Moscow in January 1970, the TASS account of as-Sadat's  
7 March speech fails to mention his announcement that he paid a  
secret visit to Moscow on 1-2 March. The Soviet leaders, he said,  
"sent word to me that they thought conditions required  
consultations between us," and he added that during his  
meetings with Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin, "we discussed  
all matters and all possibilities frankly, clearly, and  
truthfully."

Providing details in its 8 March issue, the Cairo AL-AHRAM said that as-Sadat had received a letter from the Soviet leaders "toward the end of February" suggesting that the situation required high-level consultations, and that he gave Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov his reply on 27 February. During the two-day stay, the paper added, as-Sadat met a total of 9 hours with the Soviet leaders and several advisers, including Defense Minister Grechko. On the 10th AL-AHRAM reported that Deputy Premier Dr. 'Aziz Sidqi--who left for Moscow on the 9th heading an economic delegation--would deliver a message from as-Sadat to Brezhnev.

The short TASS report on as-Sadat's speech also makes no mention of as-Sadat's call on the Big Four to continue following up the crisis, nor his appeal to the United States "to fulfill the pledge it made" regarding U.S. objection to seizure of lands by force.

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## DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

### MOSCOW CALLS BAN ON CB WEAPONS MAIN ISSUE AT GENEVA TALKS

Moscow has devoted only minimal propaganda attention over the past two weeks to the proceedings of the 26-nation Geneva disarmament conference,\* which reconvened on 23 February after a recess of nearly six months. Hailing the recently signed treaty restricting the deployment of mass-destruction weapons on the seabed as evidence that difficult disarmament problems can be resolved, Soviet propaganda goes on to stress that a ban on the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons will be "one of the main questions" at the current session of the conference.

Chief Soviet delegate Roshchin, in remarks on the 19th as well as in his opening statement on the 23d, emphasized the importance of banning CB weapons. In both instances, he also mentioned the need to conclude a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty and to resolve the broader problem of general and complete disarmament. While the bulk of available Soviet comment has focused on these three issues, there have been some references to other stock partial disarmament measures. A foreign-language radio commentary on the 23d, for example, suggested that attention will also be given to a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of foreign military bases, and the creation of nuclear-free zones "in various parts of the world."

**ATTACK ON** Moscow sustains its attack on the U.S. and  
**U.S. POSTURE** British proposal to separate a ban on  
bacteriological weapons from a ban on  
chemical weapons. An article in PRAVDA by Bragin on the 25th, for example, charged that Washington and London have "tried to obstruct a solution" in an effort "to justify the barbaric use of poisonous matters by the American aggressors in Vietnam and the stockpiling of chemical weapons in NATO stores in Europe."

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\* Moscow has noted, without comment, that France continues to boycott the conference. TASS on the 23d listed the 25 participating countries and added that France "in recent years has not been participating in the proceedings" at Geneva.

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Bragin added that President Nixon in his message to the conference stated the necessity for a "separate" approach to a ban on CB weapons, "referring to a put-up thesis that 'at the present time control over chemical weapons allegedly cannot be implemented.'"

Reporting the 9 March session of the conference, the domestic service said that the U.S. delegate, in calling for an agreement on bacteriological weapons only, in fact sought "to guarantee the Pentagon generals the possibility of further using chemical weapons in Vietnam." And TASS commentator Kornilov on the 9th concluded that U.S. "maneuvers" in this regard are not "accidental" in view of Washington's "wide-scale" use of chemical weapons in Vietnam.

TASS on the 6th, reporting Secretary Rogers' testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the day before, said that he urged ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on CB weapons, but with the reservation that the United States be allowed to use herbicides and tear gas in warfare. According to TASS, Rogers "could not but admit that the majority" of the signators to the Geneva Protocol "stood for the abrogation of the use of any toxic agents in warfare."

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## GERMANY AND BERLIN

## GDR MEDIA IGNORE LIMITATIONS PLACED ON TALKS WITH SENAT

East German publicity for the first meeting between West Berlin Senat Director Ulrich Mueller and GDR State Secretary and First Deputy Foreign Minister Guenter Kohrt, in East Berlin on 6 March, failed to note the Senat's limitation of the talks to arranging for West Berliners to visit the GDR, including East Berlin, during the Easter holidays. In proposing the talks in a letter publicized in East German media on 25 February, GDR Premier Stoph had suggested broader talks with the Senat on relations between West Berlin and the GDR, stipulating that if this were not acceptable there could be talks on the question of Easter visits.

Predictably, GDR media have carried no hint of acknowledgment that the delay in starting the talks was caused by the intermittent slowdowns of traffic on the autobahns to West Berlin on 3 March, staged in response to the 3-5 March meeting of CDU/CSU Bundestag and landtag chairmen in West Berlin and to Chancellor Brandt's visit to the city on the 5th for an SPD electoral meeting. The CDU/CSU meeting drew a GDR Foreign Ministry statement of protest on 26 February, and Brandt's visit prompted ADN to recall on the 5th that his appearances in West Berlin had been "recently protested" by the GDR Foreign Ministry spokesman as an act which "violates the status of West Berlin" and is designed to create conflict in the center of Europe.

ADN reported on 2 March that the GDR Government had proposed 4 March as the opening date for Senat-GDR negotiations. On the 3d, coincident with the autobahn slowdown, ADN reported that West Berlin Mayor Schuetz had responded to Stoph's proposal to hold the talks but that Schuetz had said "he was unable to accept the date suggested by the GDR" and would propose another. On the 5th ADN said Schuetz had proposed on the preceding day that the talks begin on the 6th, adding that Kohrt then invited Mueller to come to "the GDR capital" on 6 March.

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Briefly reporting on the 6 March Mueller-Kohrt meeting, with no mention of the limitation of the agenda to Easter visits, ADN said "negotiations on questions of mutual interest" had started that day "in the GDR capital," pointing out that the initiative had been taken in Stoph's February letter to Schuetz. It added that the talks would continue "in West Berlin" on 12 March, two days before the West Berlin elections. TASS and the Moscow central press have reported in detail the steps leading to the 6 March meeting, generally citing ADN.

GDR media have reported routinely and without comment the eighth meeting between West and East German State Secretaries Bahr and Kohl held in East Berlin on 8 March, two days after the first Mueller-Kohrt meeting, noting that the next meeting is scheduled for 17 March.

**DANELIUS ROLE IN CONVENING TALKS** In an obvious attempt to garner votes in the 14 March West Berlin elections, the chairman of the Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin (SEW), Danelius, was quoted by ADN and NEUES DEUTSCHLAND as saying at an election meeting on the 3d, before the final arrangements for the Senat-GDR talks were announced: "I have discussed in detail with the GDR premier what is now contained in the letter from Mr. Stoph to Schuetz. To put it quite plainly: The SEW has decisively influenced the formulation of the generous GDR offer to the Senat and to the West Berliners."

#### SOVIET, GDR MEDIA ADOPT FOUR-POWER "NEGOTIATIONS" FORMULA

In their reports of the official communique on the 16th four-power ambassadorial meeting held 9 March in West Berlin, both Soviet and East Berlin media now reflect the formulation--used for the first time in the official communique on the 15th meeting on 18 February--describing the discussions as "negotiations."\* In reporting the 15th meeting, ADN and TASS had stuck to the old formula that the four envoys met "within the framework of an exchange of views on questions connected with the situation in West Berlin." And an ADN dispatch in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND substituted the word "talks" (Gespraeche) for "negotiations" (Verhandlungen) in an otherwise virtual text of the communique. A week later, however, the four-power meetings were duly labeled "negotiations" in the GDR Foreign Ministry statement of 26 February protesting the CDU/CSU meeting in West Berlin.

\* TASS Russian on 9 March used the word "peregovory," which can be rendered "negotiations" or "talks." ADN used the word "Verhandlungen."

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Neither Soviet nor East German media have been heard to comment on the U.S. press publicity for the State Department background briefing of the press on 1 March in which the Western negotiating position on Berlin was outlined in detail. Nor has there been any Moscow publicity for the statement attributed to Soviet Ambassador Abrasimov by Western news agencies after the 9 March meeting to the effect that the four-power ambassadorial negotiations are "slowly but surely moving forward."

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## SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

### PRC DECRIES "AGGRESSIVE" THRUST OF NIXON FOREIGN POLICY REPORT

Peking's first full commentary on the President's foreign policy report took the same form, and was issued after a similar time lag, as its response to last year's Presidential message--an NCNA report released 5 March, eight days after the President's report. A comparable NCNA item last year followed the President's message by 10 days.\* In substance, Peking's reaction is notable this year for a more respectful treatment of U.S. power. Ridicule of alleged U.S. weakness and brandishment of Chinese strength had pervaded last year's comment.

NCNA does remark that the United States' "insistence on continued aggression far exceeds its power," but it focuses on Washington's "intention to stick to its policy of global aggression" and presents the Nixon Doctrine as an attempt to maintain world leadership by forcing subordinate allies to increase their material contributions in pursuit of the goal of U.S. hegemony.

While quoting the President on serious differences between the United States and the Soviet Union, NCNA treats the President's report chiefly as a call for clearer demarcation of spheres of influence between the "superpowers". Where last year's NCNA comment played up rivalries between the United States and the USSR in Europe, this year's quotes the President as saying that lines of demarcation "are being firmly drawn in Europe" but that "where such lines do not exist," as in the Middle East, there is the "risk of involving the Soviet policy and ours in a collision that could distinctly be impossible to control."

In line with the PRC's current practice of playing down its aspirations and qualifications for superpower status, the NCNA commentary is devoid of the kind of rhetoric on Chinese and third world strength that had figured prominently in its reaction in 1970. This time NCNA mentions neither Chinese nuclear strength nor the "developing revolutionary armed

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\*Unlike last year, the current NCNA report was preceded by some passing mentions of the President's message in Peking comment as well as by Peking publicity for hostile comment from Tirana and Pyongyang and for the DRV Foreign Ministry statement responding to the message. See the FBIS Special Memorandum of 4 March 1971, "Foreign Radio and Press Reaction to President Nixon's 1971 Report on U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's."

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struggle," both cited last year as obstacles to the United States. PRC media have announced neither the latest Chinese thermonuclear experiment, in October, nor the launching of a second earth satellite on 3 March.

NCNA singles out the Taiwan issue as the focal point of Sino-U.S. contention, condemning the President's statement that the United States will oppose the expulsion of Taiwan from the United Nations. It does not address itself to the implications for PRC entry into the United Nations, restricting itself to a pro forma swing at the "two Chinas" policy.

The commentary contains a noncommittal acknowledgment of the President's reference to the "People's Republic of China." Remarking that the President "had the effrontery to dwell specifically on 'the problem of China,'" NCNA goes on to note without comment that he had said "hostility between ourselves and the People's Republic of China is another unresolved problem." (The Tokyo ASAHI on 3 March quoted Chou En-lai as stating on the 1st that the United States "can no longer help but call our country the People's Republic of China.")

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## PRC SATELLITE

### LAUNCH UNREPORTED BY PEKING, NOTED BY HAVANA, BELGRADE

Peking has not publicized the launching of the second Chinese earth satellite on 3 March, reported by NORAD, and the only available explicit references to it in the media of communist countries have come from Havana and Belgrade. China's space achievements are noted in general terms, without reference to the 3 March launching, in DRV propaganda surrounding Chou En-lai's 5-8 March visit to Hanoi. Pham Van Dong, in a speech at a banquet honoring Chou on the 5th, said that China has become a powerful socialist country with a modern industry, a developed agriculture, "a mighty national defense, and an advanced science and technology, whose brilliant illustration is the signal progress in the development of nuclear weapons and in the conquest of outer space." Pham's remarks, carried belatedly by VNA on the 8th, are echoed in a 9 March NHAN DAN editorial which declares--as reviewed by VNA--that the PRC's achievements in the development of nuclear weapons and "in the study of the cosmos" are "wonders which have won the admiration of the whole world."

Radio Havana, in a 5 March news report on the launch, said it demonstrates that China has emerged from backwardness to occupy a first-rank position in space exploration and shows that the PRC "is without question ever increasingly playing the role it should in today's world--on earth and in space." TANJUG's review of the Yugoslav press on the 4th reported that the Belgrade POLITIKA had called the launch "a great scientific achievement" indicating a high level of science and technology. At the same time, the paper observed, "it is indicative of an improvement in armament, since the rockets intended to carry nuclear warheads may even be identical with cosmic rockets--the question is only what cargo they carry."

The first Chinese satellite, launched on 24 April 1970, was announced by Peking in a widely disseminated press communique the following day.\* Through early May the feat was publicized in a substantial volume of Chinese propaganda consisting largely

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\* For reports on publicity for the April launch, see the TRENDS of 29 April 1970, pages 22-25, and 6 May 1970, pages 34-36.

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of progress reports on the flight of the spacecraft, reports of congratulatory messages, and accounts of local celebrations throughout the country. Reactions to the April launch from the communist countries for the most part followed customary patterns of reaction to Chinese nuclear testing. The DRV, like Albania and North Korea, publicized its usual congratulatory message as well as comment applauding the exploit. Additionally, for the first time, Yugoslavia and Romania--the former seeking improved relations with Peking and the latter flaunting its independent position in the polarized communist movement--publicized messages of congratulation. Moscow and its other East European allies routinely reported the launch in dispatches citing NCNA. Soviet media have never taken cognizance of a Chinese test that Peking has not announced.

Peking media's longest delay in publicizing a nuclear test or space achievement was in 1969, when two tests on 23 and 29 September were announced belatedly on 4 October. If Peking remains silent on the latest satellite launch, the explanation could lie in part in an absence of grounds for a claim to have broken major new technological ground. In January 1968, after the first of Peking's two unannounced nuclear tests, Chou En-lai was quoted in a Tokyo broadcast as telling a visiting Japanese goodwill delegation that Peking had made announcements of its nuclear tests "whenever new properties were obtained." Peking's silence could also relate to its current line on the "superpowers" and its disclaimer of intent to join their ranks.\*

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\* See the Sino-U.S. Relations section of this TRENDS.

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## PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## SHENSI FORMS ITS PARTY COMMITTEE, ELEVENTH IN NATION

Establishment of a provincial party committee for Shensi Province, Mao's revolutionary base during the 1936-48 period, was announced by NCNA on 7 March. Eleven of the PRC's 29 provincial-level administrative subdivisions have now set up their new party committees.

The NCNA announcement was released 18 days after the Shensi provincial radio on 17 February claimed major successes in rebuilding lower-level party committees throughout the province. The provincial congress, meeting in Yen-an from 28 February to 5 March, elected 68 members and 29 alternates to the new committee--larger than the previous Shensi committee. As in all other cases, the announcement said the Shensi committee was formed on the basis of the "three-in-one alliance" of old, middle-aged, and young.

In contrast with the heavy military representation on other provincial-level party committees--Shanghai being the only exception--Shensi's five-man leadership group is somewhat less military in character. Three civilians and two military men, all entrenched provincial figures, claimed positions on the new secretariat. The number one spot went to civilian provincial chief Li Jui-shan, a former secretary on the old Hunan party committee, who was transferred to Shensi in 1967. Since October 1969, Li has held the concurrent position of first political commissar of the Shensi Military District (MD). He is now also identified as past leader of the party nucleus group.

Both secretaries on the new committee--Hu Wei and Huang Ching-yao--are military men transferred to Shensi in 1967 with their military units. Hu, a former deputy army commander from neighboring Shansi, is a vice chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee and a member of the support-the-left committee within the Shensi MD. Huang, former deputy commander of the Heilungkiang MD, is also a vice chairman and commander of the Shensi MD. Two civilians, Hsiao Chun and Wu Kuei-hsien, were named deputy secretaries on the new committee. Hsiao, a former secretary on the old provincial party committee, holds a concurrent vice chairmanship. Wu, a woman elected to full Central Committee membership in 1969, is also a member of the provincial revolutionary committee.

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## NEW PARTY COMMITTEES AT COUNTY OR HIGHER LEVEL

<u>Provincial- level Unit</u>	<u>Province</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>County</u>
Anhwei*	+		2	15
Chekiang*	+		1	28
Fukien				12
Kiangsi	+	3	1	18
Kiangsu	+	2	2	17
Shanghai	+			5
Shantung			1	3
Honan*				14
Hunan*	+		all	all
Hupei		2	1	8
Kwangsi*	+			15
Kwangtung*	+	5	5	16
Hopeh				7
Inner Mongolia				
Peking				2
Shansi				6
Tientsin				
Heilungkiang			1	18
Kirin		1		12
Liaoning	+	1	2	14
Kansu*	+			17
Ningsia				4
Shensi*	+	2		8
Sinkiang		1		6
Tsinghai		2		5
Kweichow				
Szechwan				
Tibet				
Yunnan				5

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\* Apart from announcing individual new party committees, the provincial radio has claimed that "a majority of" or "many" counties and/or municipalities have formed party committees. Hunan alone has claimed new committees for all counties and municipalities within the province.

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highlighting the unique status of Mao's former revolutionary base, the provincial party congress met in Yen-an rather than Sian, the provincial capital. All other provincial party committees were established after local congresses convened in the respective capital cities. Abundant praise for Mao ran through the NCNA report as it stressed the need to continue "the Yen-an spirit" of "plain living" and "hard struggle" in meeting future objectives. A SHENSI DAILY editorial, broadcast by Sian radio on 8 March, in welcoming the new committee exuberantly praised Mao and Yen-an's historical role. When Shensi established its provincial revolutionary committee in May 1968, the propaganda similarly recalled the glorious past of Yen-an; but the provincial-level rally to announce the new committee was held in Sian rather than Yen-an.

**PROGRESS AT LOWER LEVELS**      Proclaiming victory in regard to serious factional problems which had previously hindered the progress of rebuilding the party within Honan, Chengchow radio on 3 March reported far-reaching successes in rebuilding county and municipal party units throughout the province. Similar claims by 7 of the 11 provinces with new party committees were broadcast shortly before provincial committees were announced for each.

Hunan, a pacesetter during the campaign to rebuild the party, became the first province to claim new party committees for all counties and municipalities throughout the province; no special district party committees have yet been mentioned, however. The claim, reported by Changsha radio on 27 February, was contained in a speech by Hunan's party leader, Hua Kuo-feng, to a provincial activist congress.

Elsewhere, various radio reports indicate a recent flurry of rebuilding activity, particularly at the special district level. Urumchi radio on 5 March, announcing Sinkiang's highest level rebuilt committee, reported on the formation of the Changchi autonomous district party committee. Strengthening its provincial party apparatus, Kiangsu announced its first two special district party committees on 5 and 6 March. New committees were also announced for the Shaokuan and Shantou special districts by Canton radio on 5 and 7 March.

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The high priority that party building now commands was reflected in a 6 March Kirin broadcast. Claiming that over "75 percent of basic-level units" within Changchun municipality have established party organizations, the report urged the speedy completion of party-building tasks in order to greet the 50th anniversary of the CCP "and the smooth convocation of the fourth National People's Congress with still greater victories."

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## USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## EDITOR OF SLAVOPHILE JOURNAL MOLODAYA GVARDIYA IS REMOVED

In an effort to impose strict ideological orthodoxy on the cultural front, the chief editor of MOLODAYA GVARDIYA, Anatoliy Nikonov, has recently been removed from his post. Under Nikonov's leadership, MOLODAYA GVARDIYA gained a unique reputation for its vigorous espousal of Slavophile ideas--typified by militant hostility toward the West and uncritical adulation of Russian historical traditions and institutions--as well as for its sharp criticism of the liberal journals NOVY MIR and YUNOST.

Although MOLODAYA GVARDIYA's unorthodox traditionalism was long tolerated by the regime, which recognized the popularity of such an approach, the journal came increasingly under attack following the crackdown on NOVY MIR last year. It may be significant that the editor's dismissal coincides with the reported appearance of a new underground Slavophile journal VECHE.

Nikonov, chief editor since mid-1963, was last identified in that post in the January 1971 issue of MOLODAYA GVARDIYA (signed to press 21 December 1970). The February issue (signed to press 20 January 1971) failed to list a chief editor and dropped Nikonov from the editorial board. The February issue of ZHURNALIST reported the appointment of 38-year old journalist and party official Feliks Ovcharenko as chief editor. Ovcharenko is a Ukrainian with a record of ideological orthodoxy, but never a proponent of Russian chauvinist, pro-peasant theories. Several of the incumbents on his editorial board--Mikhail Lobanov, Vladimir Soloukhin, Vasily Fedorov, Vladimir Chivilikhin, and Petr Proskurin--have at various times expounded Slavophile ideas.

**MOUNTING CRITICISM** MOLODAYA GVARDIYA, long at odds with liberal journals NOVY MIR and YUNOST, angered more ideologically orthodox conservatives in 1968 by publishing extremist Slavophile articles. In early 1969 it was condemned by Agitprop for "serious errors" by its editors (ZHURNALIST, May 1969). However, when a NOVY MIR article assailed MOLODAYA GVARDIYA for Slavophilism and "peasant deviation" in May 1969, the traditionalist and ideological conservatives joined forces to attack NOVY MIR in the summer and fall of 1969.

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Following the campaign against NOVY MIR, which led to the resignation of chief editor Tvardovskiy, MOLODAYA GVARDIYA again came under attack in numerous articles and at numerous writers union meetings. It was criticized primarily for presenting church leaders and reactionary philosophers in a positive light and for committing factual errors and distortions in Russian history.

MOLODAYA GVARDIYA's spokesmen fought back in the press and at the March 1970 RSFSR Writers Union congress. The MOLODAYA GVARDIYA group of writers was defended at the congress by RSFSR Writers Union board secretary Vasiliy Fedorov (a member of MOLODAYA GVARDIYA's editorial board), NASH SOVREMENNIK editor Sergey Vikulov (a close ally of MOLODAYA GVARDIYA) and neo-Stalinist novelist Vitaliy Zakrutkin (LITERARY RUSSIA, 27 March and 3 April 1970). Vikulov complained bitterly that attacks on MOLODAYA GVARDIYA had appeared in NOVY MIR, YUNOST, QUESTIONS OF LITERATURE, LITERARY RUSSIA, LITERARY GAZETTE, and SCIENCE AND RELIGION.

The attacks on MOLODAYA GVARDIYA continued in 1970, culminating in V. Ivanov's lengthy broadside in the November issue of KOMMUNIST (No. 17). Complaining that MOLODAYA GVARDIYA's writers were making historical evaluations "contrary to Marxist-Leninist methodology," trying to find "progressive" features in Tsarist policies, and "casting aspersions on people whom Lenin called heroes," Ivanov charged that the journal's authors persistently failed to heed "rational, objective criticism." Instead, he complained, some MOLODAYA GVARDIYA authors "went even further in their errors . . ." and the journal failed to alter its "line." Ivanov concluded with a warning that the Soviet public was alarmed at MOLODAYA GVARDIYA's "clearly mistaken tilt."

NEW EDITOR      Ovcharenko is no stranger to MOLODAYA GVARDIYA. He has authored articles in that journal and in MOSKVA, which sympathizes with MOLODAYA GVARDIYA, and he has praised such Slavophiles as Soloukhin, Fedorov, and P. Vykhodtsev, albeit without endorsing their philosophy. Ukrainian by birth, his professional career took shape in industrial centers of the Urals. He was a reporter and then editor of newspapers in Sverdlovsk 1958-1964 (Kirilenko was Sverdlovsk first secretary 1955-1962), and he became editor of KOMOSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA's literature and art department sometime in 1967. According to ZHURNALIST, he was transferred to "responsible party work" in 1968.

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Ovcharenko's orthodoxy was displayed in his first central press article which reported Sholokhov's warning that toying with Western bourgeois ideas by writers "in fact turns into complicity with the enemy" (MOLODOY KOMMUNIST, September 1967). He also authored a long and vicious 18 January 1968 attack in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on Yuriy Galanskov and Aleksandr Ginzburg at the conclusion of their trial. Ginzburg's mother was so incensed by Ovcharenko's charge that her son was a "paid "agent" of the emigre NTS organization--an accusation not even made at the trial--that she attempted to sue him for slander (according to the April 1968 emigre journal POSEV). The same issue of POSEV published a letter from trial witness Ye. I. Kushev accusing Ovcharenko of "deliberately lying."

Later in 1968 Ovcharenko, writing in MOLODAYA GWARDIYA (No. 11), criticized liberal writers V. Aksenov, A. Voznesenskiy and V. Katayev as pseudoinnovators, attacked those writers who admire such authors as Pasternak, Babel, and Mandelshtam, and praised the work of conservatives Soloukhin, Sholokhov, and Fedorov. Ovcharenko declared that "it is pleasing in the extreme . . . that the noisy torrent of pseudocontemporary upstarts is drying up before our eyes, while the readers' attention and sympathies are more and more being captured by literature with lasting value." He included in the latter category the works of such conservatives as M. Alekseyev, V. Chivilikhin and P. Proskurin; Alekseyev is chief editor of MOSKVA, while Chivilikhin and Proskurin are members of MOLODAYA GWARDIYA's editorial board.

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